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A CRITICAL ASSESSM ENT OF PRIVATIZATION 
IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES:
QUANTITY IS NOT QUALITY
The author seeks an answer to the question what the unheeded practical and theoretical issues backing both the 
quantitative success and the quantitative failure story of privatisation are? Among those listed in this paper, 
management coalitions, the blurred dividing line between shareholders and stakeholders, the relative impor­
tance of ownership and management, financial-industrial groups, interlocking directorates, the violation of 
shareholders4 rights and the corrupted redistribution of capital and property rights are included. From a brief 
examination of such issues the author would derive which are the still tricky problems that remain to be solved 
in the second stage of the privatization process and that are to be analyzed in the near future.1
Privatization has been considered as the institutional cor­
nerstone of the economic transformation process in tran­
sition countries -  TCs2 -  under the argument that the pri­
ority target of economies on the way out from the former 
centrally planned system must be to improve their eco­
nomic efficiency. So that the success or failure of the pri­
vatization drive in TCs must be judged first as regards its 
impact on economic efficiency, whatever the secondary 
(political, fiscal, financial, industrial, ideological) objec­
tives of privatization could have been.3 In order to cir­
cumvent a long-lasting methodological discussion about 
the accurate criteria of economic efficiency, we would 
stick here, in the present economic context of TCs, to the 
significance of privatization assets for (macro)-economic 
growth, enterprise (micro)-economic performances and 
the attractiveness of TCs' privatization to foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Privatization appears to be a success 
story in TCs when assessed with such quantitative crite­
ria. But it is not the whole story. The privatization drive 
has encountered various shortcomings in its achievement, 
depending on the historical legacy specific to each TC 
and on how privatization techniques4 have been traded 
off in the local (economic and political) context. The out­
come of privatization is also path-dependent on policy
decisions made in the very early years of the post- 
Socialist transition,5 and is plagued with two basic 'locks 
in' which are the unresolved corporate governance issue 
and the residual State property that are so widespread in 
privatized enterprises that only a fierce optimist would 
not assess them as signs of a qualitative failure.
Beyond quantitative and qualitative evaluation of pri­
vatization policies, no one can resart to theoretical impli­
cations of the observed results, namely to the question: 
was not it the whole standard privatization train of 
thought too much simplistic or even inaccurate in the eco­
nomic conditions of the broken-up former Socialist sys­
tem? In other words, what are the unheeded practical and 
theoretical issues backing both the quantitative success 
and the qualitative failure story? Among those listed in 
this paper, we include management coalitions, the blurred 
dividing line between shareholders and stakeholders, the 
relative importance of ownership and management, finan­
cial-industrial groups, interlocking directorates, the viola­
tion of shareholders' rights and the corrupted redistribu­
tion of capital and property rights. From a brief examina­
tion of such issues, we would derive which are the still 
tricky problems that remain to be solved in the second 
stage of the privatization process and that are to be ana­
lyzed in the near future.
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Privatization and economic efficiency: 
a quantitative success story
Macroeconomic efficiency
First, let us assume for a while, that the biggest concern 
is how much extensive is the privatization process; that is 
the so-called quantitative dimension (Radygin 1994) of 
privatization which is supposed to matter. In this respect, 
the share of private production (sector) in GDP is a rather 
significant index (Table 1, page 84), although it is a rough 
one, but quite easier to evaluate than the precise number 
of privatized enterprises (Table 2, page 85), and safe from 
methodological tricks undermining the valuation of assets 
(Mihály). For instance, this share is over 50% in eight 
Central Eastern European countries (CEECs) and in one 
of the New Independent States -  Russia -  by the end of 
1995, and might have reached 80% in some countries like 
Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1997. On the 
other hand, the lowest share is observed in Belarus, 
Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan. To put it otherwise, only 
four TCs (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and 
Slovakia) got the mark 4 for both large-scale and small- 
scale privatization in the EBRD (1997) evaluation. Only 
Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan got two marks 2 and 
Belarus got 1 for large privatization and 2 for small pri­
vatization.6 More details on this scattered distribution of 
the quantitative success of privatization among TCs are 
available in CEEPN (1997) and validate both ideas of a 
specific trajectory towards a private economy in each 
country -  with a wide gap between some so-called 'most- 
advanced' CEECs and some lagging NIS -, and of an 
uneven efficiency between various (mixes of) methods of 
privatization. Note that the 'most-advanced' TCs usually 
are those that first moved into the privatization drive 
while the laggards are late comers (or still in the starting 
blocks like Belarus).
However, the share of private sector in GDP grows as 
the result of three cumulative factors: the transfer of pub­
lic assets into private hands (small and large privatiza­
tion), the increase in the number of private enterprises 
created from scratch (i.e. the number of new start-ups net 
of their bankruptcies7 ), and the higher growth rate of pro­
duction in the private sector compared with the growth of 
the still existing public sector.8 Defining privatization in 
this macroeconomic sense is relevant to assess whether it 
is likely to have raised macroeconomic efficiency in TCs 
over the one of former centrally planned economies. At 
this level of analysis, we have proceeded to a rough 
econometric test through a regression of the index of
GDP growth (Ig) on the share of private sector (Sps), for 
a sample of 25 TCs with available data (Table I). Of 
course, there are several other variables explaining eco­
nomic growth than ownership of the factors of produc­
tion. But, under the assumption of privatization triggering 
economic efficiency, private resource ownership must 
facilitate or even boost economic growth. Thus, we have 
to expect that the regression coefficient between Ig and 
Sps must be positive if we want it to confirm that privati­
zation paves the way for economic efficiency and growth, 
even though the observed results must be taken with a 
pinch of salt due to the very rough statistical estimate of 
Sps from World Bank's data. The limited number of 
observations compels us to rely more on adjusted corre­
lation coefficients.
1990 1995
Sps Constant Sps Constant
Coefficient - 23.395 97.952 30.114 86.477
t -  Student 1.396 47.024 4.264 27.724
Number of observations = 25 n = 25 
R2 = 0.078 R2 = 0.441
Adjusted R2 = 0.038 Adjusted R2 = 0.417
Results for 1990 are rather comforting the aforemen­
tioned assumption. At the starting point of the privatiza­
tion drive, the coefficient of Sps is not positive and is not 
significant at a 5% threshold; the adjusted correlation 
coefficient is very low. The share of private sector, while 
small, does not explain GDP growth at all. In 1995, the 
coefficient of Sps is positive, and 41.7% of the variance 
of the economic growth index is explained by the linear 
regression, with significant coefficients (at p < 5%). The 
hypothesis of an existing relationship between economic 
growth and privatization cannot be rejected, though the 
correlation coefficient is not very high. On the other hand, 
we have calculated the rank correlation between Ig and 
Sps and found rs = -  0.44 in 1990 which confirms the 
absence of relation between economic growth and private 
ownership. In 1995, the coefficient of rank correlation rs 
= 0.65 means a significant concordance at 5% between 
the two variables for the whole set of 25 TCs. Thus, 
though we can associate the spread of private sector and 
the recovery of economic growth, we have to oppose 
CEECs to NIS on this basis. Now when we calculate the 
rank correlation for the only countries having a positive 
rate of economic growth (Ig > 100) in 1995, we get rs = 
0.02. This means that within the subset of TCs in which 
economic growth has yet recovered in 1995 (primarily
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CEECs), the size of the private sector does not explain, as 
such, a high rate of economic growth.9 In other words, for 
example, Czech Republic with the largest share of private 
sector in 1995 only reaches the sixth rank in terms of eco­
nomic growth while Poland and Slovakia, where growth 
recovery is the strongest, are respectively ranked the 
fourth and the sixth as regards the size of private sector.
Progress in small-scale privatization has been both 
swift and comprehensive. Fourteen TCs -  nine EU asso­
ciated countries, Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Macedonia and Russia -  have reached the EBRD mark 4 
in this respect. In addition, small privatization primarily 
based on case-by-case and auction sales have met neither 
technical obstacles nor strong political opposition insofar 
as it has even been launched by the Communist power in 
some TCs, like Hungary since 1982. The only shadow on 
the picture here is the privatization of agriculture, name­
ly in the NIS where agriculture is still largely organized 
around large collective farms and there are still restric­
tions on the tradebility of land rights.
The outcome of big privatization is less bright. The 
supporters of rapid mass privatization usually focus on 
Czech Republic where, as soon as 1995, over 80% of big 
and medium-sized State-owned enterprises have been 
transfered to economic entities which are distinct from 
the central State (Table 2). On the other hand, by the end 
of 1995, rather few big State run enterprises have been 
really privatized in TCs such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Romania, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
and, while big privatization is more widespread in other 
TCs, it still does not reach 50% of all big State-owned 
enterprises in 1997, except in Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Estonia. From this overall picture, we have 
to stress that trade sales of State assets and enterprises do 
make only 6,204 cases, i.e. 13% of all big privatizations 
gathered in Table 2. The privileged method is manage­
ment-employee buy-out -  MEBO (43% of all cases), fol­
lowed by mass privatization (23.5%) and 'other' methods 
(13%), basically municipalization and restitution of 
assets. Trade sales of assets is the primary method in 
Hungary, Estonia and more recentlyvT3ulgaria, while there 
is voucher (mass) privatization in Czech Republic, 
Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakh­
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, and MEBO is prevailing 
in Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedo­
nia, Romania, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan. Stalling pro­
grammes of mass privatization have restarted in Bulgaria 
and Romania in 1997, while mass privatization plans are 
finally implemented in Azerbaijan and Croatia.
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Microeconomic performance 
in a changing environment
At a microeconomic level, the first basic performance cri­
terion to be assessed is the effect of privatization on enter­
prise profitability, otherwise one could not understand 
why privatization was so urgently needed to maintain 
enterprises’ balance sheets in the red. Based on a large 
sample of 200 to more than 1,000 industrial enterprises 
by country, for seven CEECs,10 a recent assessment (R. 
Anderson et alii 1997) shows that Czech Republic and 
Hungary -  where privatization is the most widespread -  
had the highest percentage of profitable firms (74% and 
70% respectively) in 1995, and Romania and Bulgaria the 
lowest. Even more significant, between 1992 and 1995, 
the profitability of firms has improved in almost all seven 
countries. For instance, in Poland, of a total 1,066 firms, 
835 showed an improved or steady profitability while 231 
showed a decline. The average annual growth in labour 
productivity, from 1992 to 1995, was negative only in 
Bulgaria and Romania and peaked up to 7% in Czech 
Republic and 5% in Poland and Slovakia. In the whole 
sample, labour productivity growth averaged 7.2% for 
privatized firms and -0.3% in State-owned firms. 
However, had the sample been extended to Russian and 
NIS firms, this optimistic evaluation should have been 
cooled down: recent data shows, for instance, that report­
ed profits were steadily declining in nominal terms in 
most Russian enterprises (Gavrilenkov 1998). While 26 
thousand Russian registered large and medium-sized 
firms had been profitable, another 39.5 thousand had 
been reported as loss makers.
The microeconomic performance of privatization 
appears even more impressive than the macroeconomic 
one, though the quoted results must be somewhat quali­
fied. In 1992, the seven CEECs were still deep in the eco­
nomic slump, except Poland, while in 1995, they reached 
the peak of their economic recovery, except Hungary. 
Thus we are referred back to the relationship between pri­
vatization and economic growth, from which policy rec­
ommendations should be derived for further success of 
the big privatization drive. Enterprise profitability must 
have dwindled in the CEECs with the lower rates of eco­
nomic growth in 1996-1997. Another shortcoming of the 
above-mentioned study is that it defines as „privatized” 
any firm that has more than 33% of its shares transferred 
to private investors which is debatable on the grounds of 
both corporate control theory (Andreff 1996a,b) and the 
present economic context of share ownership in TCs.
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Several privatized enterprises in the sample might well be 
still under State control, so that differences in perfor­
mance between genuinely privatized and State-controlled 
firms must be partly levelled off. All the more so if we 
consider that some major adjustment efforts in the State 
sector have been achieved indeed, including lay-offs and 
wage control by loss-making State-run firms, under the 
pressure of the final cut in open-ended subsidies and the 
threat of a more competitive buyers' market, in spite of 
the absence of a private ownership structure.11
Privatization also might have improved economic 
efficiency in TCs through attracting FDI flows. The latter 
basically result from microeconomic decisions of foreign 
investors and transnational corporations, but they are also 
influenced by macroeconomic determinants and govern­
ment policies upgrading the attractiveness of the (TC) 
host country, including the FDI treatment; privatization is 
a significant part of this treatment (M. & W. Andreff 
1997, 1998). For instance, in 111 of the 200 biggest 
Hungarian companies a foreign owner controlled a 
majority share of the stock equity in December 1995; this 
number raised up to 134 in December 1996 (Matolcsy 
1997) and 150 in 1997 (Mihály 1997b), and Hungary is 
well known as the country which had attracted the biggest 
FDI stock among all TCs, in particular the highest FDI 
per capita. On the other hand, FDI is supposed to provide 
fresh capital, technological modernization, privatization 
revenue, transfer of management skills, new industrial 
and trade cultures, a restructured organisation of the local 
enterprise, and world market penetration. So that enter­
prises whose privatization involves FDI rapidly should be 
restructured and become efficient. We have calculated, 
from (Table 3, page 86), the coefficient of rank correla­
tion between FDI per capita and the share of private sec­
tor in GDP, for a sample of 22 TCs; the coefficient is 
rather high (R2 = 0.63) and the relation between the two 
variables is significant at p < 0.2%. A last quantitative 
success story of privatization definitely consists in its 
attractiveness to FDI which contributes to the recovery of 
economic growth. Of even greater interest is the fact 
(Table 4, page 86) that attraction of foreign capital into a 
TC privatization programme is very much linked to the 
methods of privatization adopted by the host country. The 
share of foreign capital in total transaction value of priva­
tized assets is higher, on average, in TCs that have privileged 
trade sales to outsiders; this share is the weakest in TCs hav­
ing primarily resorted to voucher (mass) privatization.
Privatization was expected to act as a lever in order to 
reduce and crunch the so-called second (informal, under­
ground) economy that was blossoming in former central­
ly planned economies. Such a belief relies on the standard 
liberal economic thought advocating that the excess of 
administrative rules and regulations prevailing in the 
State sector and enterprises were the causes to which one 
has to trace back the development of illegal economic 
activities. Deregulation, State whithering away and dis­
mantling the State sector through privatization were thus 
assumed to get rid of the informal economy and to favour 
its transformation into no longer forbidden private market 
economy. Would we like to find a sign of quantitative 
failure of privatization in TCs, if any, then we had to 
focus on the following evidence: on average, the share of 
informal economy has increased, alongside with the 
progess in the privatization drive, in most TCs, and not 
the other way round (Table 5, page 86). Our guess must 
thus be that something went wrong, at least with some 
qualitative dimensions of privatization.
Two other indications introduce to some qualitative 
shortcomings of privatization, that had been forecasted as 
the unavoidable outcome of non-sale methods (Andreff 
1992, 1993a). On hand, it is the former socialist 'hard 
core' of State-owned assets in heavy industries and infra­
structures that has resisted longer the privatization 
process, even in Hungary (Mihály 1996a), and still resists 
in several TCs. On the other, it is the erosion of the wide­
spread support for privatization which was crossing the 
borders of many interest groups at the dawn of the priva­
tization process. For example, in Poland, from 1990 to 
1995, change in attitudes of Poles exhibited a weakening 
support to unrestricted privatization for all economic sec­
tors, except municipal transport (Adamski 1997). In 
1995, unrestricted privatization receives majority social 
support only for commercial activity and state farms. For 
all other sectors, respondents' preferences favoured a lim­
ited privatization while the share of supporters of no pri­
vatization in all sectors have increased since 1995. To say 
the least, the results of the overall privatization process 
have not increased satisfaction in all social groups of 
interest, a statement which obviously cannot refer mainly 
to the quantitative achievement but to the qualitative (and 
distributive) outcome of the process. This might well 
express a sort of social disappointment at the end of an 
initial stage of privatization which placed emphasis not 
only on speed (a rather satisfied preference12) but also on 
equitable distribution and the depoliticisation of property. 
The second stage of the privatization process started by 
1995-96, was more concerned with unresolved qualita­
tive issues such as concentrating dispersed private own-
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ership, improving corporate governance, getting rid of 
residual State property and investing in strategic econom­
ic restructuring rather than divesting capital or stripping 
assets in a survival adjustment behaviour.
Corporate governance and residual State property: 
qualitative limitations
„Various empirical studies -  large surveys, case studies, 
some quantitative evidence, press reports -  produce a 
very contradictory picture and it is extremely difficult to 
evaluate the degree of actual adjustment of firms” in TCs 
(Grosfeld, Roland 1995). Since 1995, it is all the more so 
with the multiplication of studies with non-converging 
results, despite an attempt at a more systematic, though 
not comprehensive, inter-country comparison (R. 
Anderson et alii 1997). What we would present here is a 
sort of „average” impression derived from our non- 
exnaustive reading of the increasingly pervasive litera­
ture, the great bulk of which leans on the theory of prop­
erty rights and focuses on the corporate governance struc­
ture resulting from privatization. According to this litera­
ture's mainstream, expanding the control of shareholders 
is thought to obviously follow from the view that share­
holders are the 'genuine' owners of corporations within 
which votes could be held, on legal principles, by share­
holders, bond holders, managers or other employees in 
any combination. The mainstream assumption is that, as 
the residual claimants of the firm's net income (profit and 
dividends), shareholders stand last in line for the distrib­
ution of gains or losses derived from the firm’s perfor­
mance and, thus, have the appropriate incentives to make 
accurate discretionary strategic decisions (Easterbrook, 
Fischel 1991). In particular, the ability to monitor man­
agers (and through them other employees) is crucial for 
shareholders, and it is effective if their property rights are 
not to be alleviated by managerial behaviour of rent-seek­
ing (larger offices, a host of handsome secretaries, 
retraining sessions on Caribbean sea shores, etc.) and of 
maximizing take home gains (higher wages, bonuses, 
personal cars, etc.). When shareowners are capable to 
monitor and discipline managers, then the profit is higher 
than otherwise; such a statement underlies the numerous 
assessments of the quality of corporate governance on the 
basis of firms’ profitability.
Before raising some doubts against this too simplistic 
view, reducing the issue of corporate governance to the 
monitoring relationship between owners and managers, 
more generally between outsiders and insiders, we will
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admit it for a first overview of qualitative limitations of 
privatization in TCs. Under such an assumption, of 
course, the more scattered the distribution of corporate 
capital, the higher the shareholder's information cost for 
monitoring managers. Efficient management and enter­
prise restructuring thus require appropriate managerial 
incentives (Aghion, Blanchard, Burgess 1993) that are 
less likely the less corporate capital is concentrated. Such 
a situation is well known as a principal-agent problem in 
which the principal is in possession of less information 
than the agent (moral hazard) and must design a suitable 
procedure for inciting managers (agents) to act according 
to the principal’s interest (maximizing profit and asset 
value). Quite logically, in their survey of the literature on 
corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue 
for the establishment of block shareholdings, whoever are 
the blockholders, including financial institutions. It is a 
great pity that post-communist reformers in TCs, 
obsessed by the speed of privatization, had precisely sup­
ported, selected and implemented those (non trade) meth­
ods of privatization which do not guarantee the emer­
gence of hard core shareholders, despite the unheard 
warnings of the fans (see footnote 12 above) of long way 
privatization for short-listed profitable enterprises. The 
objection against these warnings, that the privatization 
process would have taken decades (Schaffer et alii 1998), 
does not really hold if we are now to spend decades on 
transforming ineffective corporate governance structures 
into effective ones.
Privatization by means o f asset trade and (often) 
effective corporate governance
In the framework of the aforementioned theoretical 
hypotheses, we can range all corporate governance struc­
tures along a scale at the extreme (worst) end of which we 
find State-owned enterprises (SOEs); then come priva­
tized firms with insider control (by managers or workers 
or both) and finally private and privatized enterprises 
with the varieties of outsider control by banks, institu­
tional investors (investment funds, insurance companies, 
pension funds, etc.), domestic private shareholders, for­
eign investors, and individuals. The latter's control usual­
ly emerges in newly created enterprises (start ups) and 
from small privatization. There is no corporate gover­
nance concern in it, insofar as in a small firm a single 
owner is the „boss” (or a few owners are the bosses) who 
can discipline at a low cost a handful of managers, if any, 
and even supervise all the labour force. Of course, we
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witness here the common result of privatization through 
asset trade that had been predominant in small privatiza­
tion and in asset auctions after SOEs’ liquidations. For 
large firms, asset trade privatization is supposed to pro­
vide a strong corporate governance with either a single 
majority owner or a ,hard core’ of monitoring sharehold­
ers; they could have only a minority share, but this one 
must be higher than the share of any other coordinated 
group of shareowners, in the company stock equity. Such 
effective owners should restructure the newly privatized 
firm and adjust it to new market conditions. Nevertheless, 
a qualification of what restructuring means is now need­
ed.
Grosfeld and Roland (1995) have introduced a dis­
tinction between defensive and strategic restructuring. 
Defensive restructuring means taking measures that seek 
to reduce costs and scale down enterprise activity: cutting 
obsolete production lines, shedding labour, getting rid of 
non productive assets. These measures may be a compo­
nent of both deep restructuring and survival-oriented 
behaviour of managers and workers in privatized firms 
(Andreff 1996b, Ickes, Ryterman 1994). Strategic restruc­
turing is based on a thoughtful business strategy devel­
oped in response to a need for profound redeployment of 
assets and implies the introduction of new products, new 
processes, new technologies and thus new investment 
projects. Strategic restructuring requires effective corpo­
rate governance by residual claimants. Therefore, prof­
itability and productivity are supposed to reflect, through 
the scope and depth of restructuring, the quality of corpo­
rate governance. It follows that an hypothesis often test­
ed on various enterprise samples is whether privatized 
firms perform better than SOEs, and outsider-controlled 
outperform insider-controlled firms, in terms of prof­
itability, productivity, export and some other performance 
variables connected with a supposed enterprise restruc­
turing. As expected by the theory, various studies13 have 
shown that privatized firms outperform SOEs or improve 
their performance after privatization. Nevertheless, in 
many studies, the result is subject to a selection bias: was 
it privatization which has fostered better enterprise per­
formance or was it better performance that has led the 
enterprise to be selected for privatization? This causality 
problem remains unsolved in most studies. However, the 
choice of an asset trade method of privatization often 
reflects the fact that the firm is viable and potentially or 
really profitable under market conditions. Thus, finding 
effective owners -  either domestic or foreign -  for good 
enterprises should promote strategic restructuring.
Estonia and Hungary having opted from the very 
beginning for direct sales to strategic investors, it is quite 
logic that they have experienced less corporate gover­
nance problems, namely in FDI-acquired enterprises and 
in privatized firms with a domestic majority shareowner 
or with a group of core shareholders capable of monitor­
ing managers. However, at least two problems have 
remained unsolved in some of these firms privatized by 
means of asset sales. In privatized firms where majority 
Hungarian ownership was intended to be maintained for 
several years, sometimes after a year or two, the foreign 
strategic investor was able to accumulate enough shares 
to dominate the annual shareholders' meeting and appoint 
its own representatives to the boards (Mihály 1997b). 
This is not properly speaking a problem of weak corpo­
rate governance structure; quite the contrary, too strong 
(and too much foreign to the Hungarian taste). The sec­
ond problem is one of management and corporate gover­
nance in the presence of residual State ownership in part­
ly privatized enterprises that is dealt with below.
Weak corporate governance after non-standard methods 
o f privatization
In a large number of TCs (NIS, the countries of former 
Yugoslavia, Poland, Slovakia), the privatization process 
has primarily created insider-controlled enterprises and, 
according to the aforementioned theory, has generated a 
problem of weak or ineffective corporate governance 
structure. The latter basically comes out from the use of 
non trade, often called non standard, methods of privati­
zation. Three of them have been widely used in TCs: 
restitution, management and employee buyouts (MEBOs) 
and mass privatization (Bornstein 1997). The major con­
cern with non standard methods of privatization is the 
resulting large-scale ownership by insiders. Indeed, non 
trade privatization has benefited insiders either through 
voucher distribution with significant concession to insid­
ers or through MEBOs. According to the principal-agent 
model, insiders would prove ineffective owners, lacking 
the incentives to undertake strategic restructuring mea­
sures in privatized enterprises, in particular in enterprises 
controlled by workers. Empirical studies should confirm 
it in exhibiting lower performances in insider-controlled 
firms compared with other private enterprises, and here is 
a tricky issue.
We would not comment on restitution insofar as it 
was a significant element in small privatization and the 
problem it has triggered is not one of corporate gover­
nance, but one of delayed privatization by a lengthy
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claims process. MEBOs, because they require a large ini­
tial borrowing by managers and employees, hinder the 
firms to get enough additional credit to restructure inputs 
and output. Hence the firms do not earn enough profit to 
repay the principal within the deadline. So that many 
MEBOs have difficulty to get bank credit and they carry 
out little capital investment. Even though these are not the 
obvious consequences of an ineffective corporate gover­
nance, the latter has steadily been assumed to be the cause 
of low profitability by the principal-agent model. Mass 
privatization took different forms: voucher coupons to 
bid in auctions of company shares (the Czech „model”, 
Mertlik 1996, Sereghyova 1996), interest-free loans 
offered to citizens to buy shares in designated enterprises 
(the Hungarian scheme), and giving people free shares in 
investment funds that control operating firms (Poland). 
The outcomes of large-scale privatization include the 
extent of residual State shareholding, the concentration or 
dispersion of ownership in newly privatized firms, the 
distribution of shares between insiders and outsiders, and 
the emergence of specific institutional investors.
As to the Czech mass privatization method, it was 
assumed to trigger enterprise restructuring by new private 
owners after privatization, to be more transparent and 
fairer than asset trade, and to gain popular support for pri­
vatization and for the government in next elections. In 
1998, the Klaus government is over, financial non trans­
parence and embezzlements linked to privatization are 
among the determinants of its fall, and economic restruc­
turing does not seem to have been much more boosted in 
the Czech Republic than in other TCs. On the other hand, 
some expected shortcomings of the Czech method had 
not actually occurred: even though voucher auctions had 
been a rather daunting administrative or even 'central 
planning' (Andreff 1994c) task, due to the allowed emer­
gence of investment funds, a wide dispersion of owner­
ship and a weak corporate governance structure had not 
been revealed. Studies of samples of Czech enterprises14 
show that, in many firms, one investment fund holds 20% 
of the shares, and in other privatized firms two to four 
investment funds together hold a controlling minority, 
sometimes a majority of shares. It is often argued that 
some concentration of ownership helps corporate gover­
nance while scattered distribution of shares among many 
small shareholders is ineffective. On these grounds, the 
Czech funds probably concentrate a sufficient share in 
many privatized firms to control their management and 
strategy and handle an effective corporate governance. 
The problem is rather to know who controls the con-
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trailers. In particular, the system of cross-ownership 
among State-owned banks and investment funds (Mertlik
1996) that has emerged leaves management of these insti­
tutions insulated from external control, i.e. supposedly 
outsiders’ might well behave as insiders and this can 
explain why restructuring is often presented as luggish in 
Czech Republic. Later on, some investment funds have 
been converted into holding companies (also in Lithuania 
and Slovakia). The problem remains to know who con­
trols the holding while this latter might well hinder com­
petition and become a means of attracting State subsidies.
In the case of Russia and most NIS, mass privatiza­
tion has turned into mass asset sale to insiders, both 
incumbent managers and employees, while investment 
funds have only played a minor role in corporate gover­
nance (initial regulations limited the share of any one 
fund to 10% of any enterprise, but the threshold has been 
raised to 25% in 1994). The resulting allocation of man­
agers to privatized firms preserved the management sta­
tus quo and limited the scope for selection of new man­
agers, even though some managerial turnover had been 
observed (Fortesue 1997). The entrenchment of incum­
bent managers, survival strategies and defensive restruc­
turing have characterized the first stage of mass (non 
monetary or free) privatization. Where the managers were 
either competent or in position to bargain on their own 
terms, the evolution of ownership from insiders to out­
siders had occurred. For instance, the overall share of 
insiders in the structure of share ownership of Russian 
privatized enterprises had fallen from 62% in April 1994 
to 56% in June 1996, while the share of outsiders -  
excluding the State -  had raised from 21% to 34% 
(Andreff, Radygin, Malginov 1996). Viewed from the 
theory of principal-agent, this partial switch from insider 
to outsider ownership should improve corporate gover­
nance. But two problems are the emergence of coalitions 
gathering managers and outside owners and the illegal, 
when not corrupted or criminal, means of transferring 
shares to shameless outsiders. In Russia, we have noticed 
no less than sixteen typical violations of (small) share­
holders rights during the second stage of privatization 
based on monetary transfer (sale) of shares. Among the 
most typical are: minimal block of shares to participate at 
the election of the board, various charges and extra-pay­
ments on transactions and on participation of stockhold­
ers at general meetings, deliberate delays in convening 
these meetings, vote by show of hands, secret issues of 
special shares, misreporting on the shareholders’ register 
and so on (see also Blasi, Shleifer 1996).
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Financial industrial groups (FIGs) are another out­
come of the second stage of privatization in Russia 
(Freinkman 1995), Ukraine and other NIS. Generally 
built up by new private banks which have bought shares 
into industrial enterprises, FIGs do open in these TCs the 
well known story of finance capital which had initiated an 
earlier stage of development in market economies 
(Hilferding 1910) in which ownership control was the 
key issue instead of corporate governance. Some FIGs 
result from the transformation of former ministerial 
branches or associations into joint stock companies which 
diversified in finance and trade. All FIGs are now chal­
lenging the insider ownership in NIS industry. A 1995 law 
passed in Russia attempted both to regulate the FIGs’ 
activity and offered them tax concessions, special treat­
ment and privileges. Even though they solve, in some 
way, the corporate governance issue, FIGs re-concentrate 
monopoly powers and industrial structures that prevailed 
under central planning. Their present lack of financial 
transparency is of concern as well as it is a springboard 
for the sort of studies suggested in the third part of this 
paper.
National Investment Funds (NIFs) are specific to the 
Polish method of mass privatization. Each NIF must con­
trol a set of operating firms and eventually sell some of 
their shares, probably after some restructuring. It is thus 
admitted that large SOEs were needing restructuring 
before privatization. Each NIF is run by a private man­
agement firm owned by a consortium of several Polish 
and foreign management and banking companies. Such a 
scheme should avoid the Czech problem of controlling 
the controllers, insofar as these consortia are profit-ori­
ented, managed with Western techniques, and the banks 
involved in are affected by a more rapid privatization in 
Poland than in the Czech Republic. Insofar as no share in 
the operating firms is distributed to the population which 
can only acquire shares in the NIFs, the stock value of 
each NIF is of concern to the management consortium. 
The latter’s trade-off should be to restructure or disinvest 
from less profitable operating firms in order to invest in 
more profitable ones. Thus NIF's managers should put a 
strong pressure on managers of the operating firms in 
which the NIF holds a controlling block of shares, assign­
ing them such objectives as restructuring and seeking 
profitability; this is obviously a rather effective corporate 
governance structure. In Poland, concentrated outside 
ownership of enterprises has been created from the very 
beginning of mass privatization (delayed up to 1995 any­
way) with the target of avoiding non desirable conse­
quences in terms of corporate governance instead of 
speeding up the process.
The initial patterns of corporate governance estab­
lished in the first stage of transition will not necessarily 
remain stable over time. We have already mentioned 
some significant evolution. In Russia, large banks and 
FIGs have become the major participants in the cash sales 
of State shares in large enterprises and in the secondary 
market for equity stakes. This has led to weaken the ini­
tial control of insiders. In the Czech Republic, the con­
version of investment privatization funds into holding 
companies may have a substantial impact on the initial 
structure of corporate governance depending on who will 
control the banks which hold major stakes in these hold­
ing companies.
Testing corporate governance and restructuring
Widespread strategic restructuring has been observed in 
no TC up to 1996 (Carlin, Aghion 1996). Surveying 
empirical studies1^  to date leaves us with some robust 
findings. Foreign owners of former SOEs engage in 
strategic restructuring by bringing in expertise and capi­
tal. On average, private firms are more profitable than 
SOEs and, in line with the discussed theory, this differ­
ence reflects more defensive restructuring in SOEs. For 
privatized firms, the picture is rather blurred, but more 
studies exhibit insider-controlled firms engaged in sur­
vival-oriented adjustment than the other way round. 
Fairly representative of this mainstream results is the 
recent study by Frydman et alii (1997). While claiming to 
avoid a selection bias, this study explicitly leaves out the 
industrial 'dinosaurs' of the communist era (sic!). It finds 
that, in terms of revenue growth and employment reduc­
tion, firms owned by outsiders enjoy an advantage over 
SOEs, firms in which investment funds are the largest 
owners perform rather well, firms owned by domestic 
non-financial companies exhibit a weaker performance,16 
while insider-owned firms shed labour at significantly 
lower rates than either SOEs17 or private companies and 
do even worse on costs and revenues. Employee-owned 
firms not only behave like SOEs in terms of their revenue 
performance, but also underperform SOEs in terms of 
labour shedding. A quite orthodox conclusion derived by 
the authors is a strong case against the effectiveness of 
privatization programmes that put employees in control. 
The most annoying problem -  except the mentioned 
selection bias -  is the increasing number of conflicting 
observations that accompanies the growth of case and
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sample studies. So many different results finally may 
have the meaning that the studies did not control enough 
for country, sector and sample specificities or, more 
deeply, that something went wrong with the theoretical 
background of empirical studies, i.e. the approach to cor­
porate governance in the principal-agent analysis.
Among the most striking results that confront the 
mainstream hypotheses, let us recall the following. Some 
have found that strategic restructuring has taken place in 
all ownership types, including SOEs and insider-con­
trolled firms. Managers, under the pressure of new mar­
ket conditions, unexpectedly initiated restructuring, at 
least defensive restructuring, even in not yet privatized 
SOEs for which Pinto and van Wijbergen (1995) con­
cluded that a „behaviour remarkably in line with what 
one would expect from profit oriented forward looking 
entrepreneurs”. For the Czech Republic, Capek and 
Mertlik (1996) have not found significant restructuring in 
outside-owned firms, except in foreign-owned. Coffee 
(1996) has identified three problems in the Czech corpo­
rate structure: the securities market is neither transparent 
nor liquid, cross ownership between banks makes obscure 
the governance structure of related investment funds, and 
the State still holds significant block of shares in the- 
largest enterprises and banks. Another study (Lizal et alii
1997) has established that, contrary to the most common 
picture of the Czech method (privatization first, restruc­
turing thereafter), enterprise performances had been 
favoured by pre-privatization break-ups of SOEs that 
took place in 1990 in Czechoslovakia. Thereafter, it was 
easier to include more performant and smaller units into 
privatization programmes. On the other hand, many of 
the large (privatized) firms continued receiving credit for 
non-performing projects, and State-owned limited liabili­
ty companies dominated all domestic private firms in 
terms of the investment-production ratio (Lizal, Svejnar
1998) , so that the authors conclude that the widely 
accepted notion that during the transition investment is 
high in the new private firms and low in the SOEs is not 
supported by the larger Czech data set. Some empirical 
investigations, in particular a survey of 200 Polish manu­
facturing enterprises, have found that those firms priva­
tized to workers were relatively well performing and 
capable to adjust more flexibly because worker owner­
ship might reduce worker-manager conflicts (Earle, 
Estrin 1996); Nivet (1997) finds that Polish employee- 
owned firms are among the best performers for the ratio 
of costs to revenues and profitability. However, this result 
is arguable not because workers are better or worse own­
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ers but because workers are more likely to have bought 
profitable enterprises (the selection bias again!). A recent 
study, controlling for the selection bias (Earle, Estrin 
1997) shows that Russian firms that have been privatized 
to managers have restructured more and performed better 
compared not only to SOEs, but also to firms that have 
been privatized with dominant worker ownership.
We would not discuss the very numerous possible 
intepretations of all these conflicting results any longer. 
To say the least, the qualitative picture of corporate gov­
ernance is less bright than the quantitative evaluation of 
privatization. On the other hand, the theoretical relation­
ship postulated by the principal-agent model between 
corporate governance and restructuring (profitability, pro­
ductivity) is probably too much restrictive and, in the real 
world of current business, this relationship is affected by 
macroeconomic evolution, moreover it is not stable due 
to frequent changes in the share ownership of each single 
corporation (sales of shares, takeovers, acquisitions, etc.), 
and finally the same agent may unpredictibly18 modify 
his/her economic behaviour depending on macro and 
micro circumstances including the threat of a takeover, 
the re-distribution of share ownership whatever it is, the 
election of new members on the enterprise boards, the 
result of a proxy fight, the emergence of a FIG, the loop­
holes in the corporation law, the opportunity of corrup­
tion, and the claims of non residual claimants (a non 
exhaustive list of unheeded factors in the model). More or 
less regular bonuses, premiums, perks and bribes can link 
insiders to outsiders, in not yet fully-fledged institutions 
of a market economy, in a way unpredictible by the theo­
retical model, so that profitability for example remains a 
meaningless variable, not to speak of profit distortions in 
a still imperfect competition. A lower profit may reflect 
the existence of a coalition, though efficient, between out­
siders and insiders, which is a fairly frequent case in the 
West, not to speak of hiding profit strategies that are by 
far more widespread in TCs for tax evasion purposes. 
Before introducing some of these unheeded factors into 
the discussion, let us examine a last qualitative limitation 
of privatization in TCs: the residual State property.
Corporate governance 
and residual State property
„The success of partially privatized firms in which the 
State remains the largest owner offers perhaps the biggest 
surprise of all” (Frydman et alii 1997). Not so surprising, 




to the sum of existing domestic savings and international 
aid! Even less surprising with the use of non standard 
methods of privatization than with asset sales. Those TCs 
that have finished their first wave of large-scale privati­
zation now turn to the privatization of remaining State 
ownership in the economy (i.e. still State-owned firms) 
and of partially privatized enterprises.19 There is no other 
way-out than direct sales, auctions and tenders on a case- 
by-case approach, insofar as in the now starting second 
stage of transition, privatization is more concerned with 
attracting long-term investment into key enterprises and 
with improving corporate governance structures, than 
with the speed emphasized in the first stage. Asset trade 
should probably supplant non standard methods of priva­
tization. So that a long and lengthy process will be need­
ed to remove residual property from the State’s hands in 
some TCs.
The residual State property resulting from a privati­
zation process is more or less extensive. The least exten­
sive one is due to the State keeping a golden share in the 
stockholding of a privatized enterprise. The most exten­
sive appears with public enterprises that the State is not 
capable to sell or give away for free at the moment, so 
that these enterprises remain in full (or majority) State 
ownership. More frequently we observe a mid-way situa­
tion in TCs: the State is willing to either withdraw from 
the shareholding of the privatized enterprise but finally it 
is stuck with a minority share in total capital,20 or keep a 
blocking stake in order to discourage an unwanted for­
eign takeover. The second case often corresponds to a 
postponed privatization basically due to the current state 
of capital market or to political (governmental) change. 
For instance, in Hungary where asset trade was privi­
leged, between 1990 and 1996, the volume of divested 
assets amounts to 55% of the initial stock (Mihály 
1997a). The task that TCs are facing now is thus the pri­
vatization of 'core assets' of the former centrally planned 
economy, insofar as the first years of the privatization 
process affected chiefly the non-essential parts of the 
economy and carefully avoided privatizing (,,non-privati- 
zable”) Soviet-type heavy industries. State assets still 
consist of long-term ownership and left over shares, and 
their full privatization is unlikely to be achieved in the 
foreseeable future.
Residual State shareholdings may become an obsta­
cle to effective corporate governance due to a State pas­
sive („hands off’) management of non strategic enterpris­
es together with private owners who do not commit them­
selves into governance (the more scattered shareholding,
the more so) because they wait for full State divestiture. 
When the State remains the wholly or majority-owner in 
strategic enterprises, the situation is even worse and 
leaves room for incumbent managers to behave as stake­
holders. The problem usually emerges in the behaviour of 
the State representatives on the board of directors or the 
supervisory board of (partly) privatized enterprises 
(Schwartz 1996). They are not often committed or even 
encouraged by the State (or some State body) to take an 
active role in enterprise management, and when they are, 
it could even be to vote against the decision envisaged by 
the representatives of private owners (investment instead 
of dividend payouts, against increase of foreign capital in 
total shareholding, etc.). In addition, the State representa­
tives on the corporation boards often are civil servants, 
academics, teachers, etc., i.e. are not professional experts 
in management, accounting, finance, marketing, business 
law, etc., all skills rather rare in the TCs. They even may 
turn into a new category of stakeholders for their own 
sake, after seating some time on the corporation board, 
and then start lobbying from one board (corporation) to 
the other21 -  as in the well-known interlocking direc­
torates in the West (Bunting, Barbour 1971, Dooley 
1969). One basic purpose of this lobbying is to maintain 
the status quo (profitable to them22 ) to the detriment of 
further privatization of residual State ownership. 
Moreover, we see the very same names as owners, man­
agers, board members, ministry officials and trade union­
ists in many privatized enterprises in the TCs and this 
should deserve some new inquiries and investigations.
On the other hand, when the State keeps a share in the 
stockholding of strategic enterprises, a big issue appears 
to be the possible constraints imposed by line (or other) 
ministries or other administrative tutelage bodies on to 
the enterprise management. These constraints are used to 
be more derived from macro-economic and social poli­
cies (sustaining economic growth, cutting prices, hiring 
or not firing excess manpower, etc.) than from micro-eco­
nomic criteria of efficient management, adjustment and 
restructuring. The risk here is one of inertia in corporate 
governance and management of partially privatized enter­
prises, favouring the „survival” behaviour of insiders, 
their pressures for getting State subsidies and bail-outs, 
and the still possible politicization of residual State own­
ership and State share management. Such a risk may 
delay further privatization. Yet some bureaucratic meth­
ods and political influences have apparently survived in 
the new control system at public and partially-privatized 
enterprises in the TCs.
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In some countries, like in the Polish „capital privati­
zation”, the State had to put on a reserve percentage 
(20%) of company shares and make them available to the 
employees of the company on preferential terms. In many 
cases, the employees had not exercised their rights, and 
the unclaimed employee shares became the property of 
the State. A smaller percentage (5%) of shares were 
reserved as an endowment for national restitution funds 
to be created in the future. Hence, any strategic investor 
was not able to buy over three-quarters of a company's 
shares. In other countries, like Hungary, joint ventures 
(JV) with foreign partners have been privileged. 
Nevertheless, a joint venture is a way to create residual 
State assets corresponding to the percentage of total equi­
ty provided by the State to the JV, often 50% or more 
(Mihály 1996b). This method of privatization obviously 
leads to mixed ownership. Then the motivation and 
expertise of the foreign strategic partner determine the 
real division of power and authority and, therefore, the 
corporate governance of the JV. In the majority of 
Hungarian JVs, the State privatization entity (APV Rt.) 
had three to five seats on the board of directors. More 
important decisions are to be approved at the annual 
shareholders' meetings, but often a single representative 
of the APV Rt. vote with all the shares the State happens 
to own. He/she usually did not behave exactly as a share- 
owner, being a civil servant. Therefore, there is again a 
principal-agent problem: who is vested with the power to 
give guidelines to board members appointed by the State? 
The question arises all the more that the board members 
are responsible for their actions (and can even be sued in 
a court).
Finally, the TCs might well be stuck with residual 
State ownership for a while. What is to be done? To some 
extent, the main difference between private and public is 
not ownership (Boss 1986). The main difference is man­
agement and the multitude of political and economic 
determinants of public enterprises’ activities as compared 
to the mainly commercial determinants of private enter­
prises. The French story exhibits anyway that a privatiza­
tion of management (with the government imposing a 
profit-seeking and market-oriented behaviour upon man­
agers) is the best springboard for a further transfer of the 
(then profitable) State assets to private owners (Andreff 
1987, 1992). For partially-privatized enterprises and still 
State-owned enterprises in the TCs, such an experience of 
privatization of management that warranted furter priva­
tization of assets in French public enterprises should be of 
interest.
For instance in Hungary, the State agencies have 
made some attempts to manage State assets by indirect 
business-like methods; their basic idea was formulated as 
„private management of State assets” subcontracted for 
predetermined terms and fees (Csillag et alii 1996). What 
we have in mind under the wording „privatization of 
management” is quite different and unrelated to subcon­
tracting State assets, but relates to the management crite­
ria implemented in the public and partially-privatized 
enterprises, to manager incentives and behaviour in the 
daily management and on corporation boards, and to the 
strategy of the State and its representatives on these 
boards, in particular how did (and do) they vote. It is not 
enough to distinguish passive, selective and active man­
agement of residual State shares, as in the Czech 
Republic (Brom 1996), without elaborating on the crite­
ria and targets provided in these three approaches to man­
agement and on the impact of management on the future 
value (and thus on profitability) of State shares which 
remain to be sold. That is the reason why the creation of 
holding companies is never a solution unless these hold­
ings do behave as private investors, maximizing profit 
and the value of their assets (and thus 'inciting' the man­
agers of operating enterprises to downsizing, lay-offs, 
asset reallocation, financial and physical restructuring, 
etc.), i.e. unless they are private and not State-run hold­
ings.23 In Poland, there is some evidence that -  if taken 
as one management criterion of public enterprises, like in 
France -  the decrease of employment has been sharp in 
the State sector (Mickiewicz 1996) reinforcing the argu­
ment that „the key issue is not to privatise a firm but to 
improve its governance structure” and, we would add, its 
management criteria. Some hindrances24 to the privati­
zation of management may appear where (Hungary, the 
Czech Republic) a so-called ,recombinant property’ 
(Stark 1996) has created networks of assets and man­
agers, connected with chains of debt, which are likely to 
trigger lock-in effects (Pistor, Turkewitz 1996).
Thus, we can only agree with the ,soft landing’ atti­
tude, compared to speeding privatization at any cost, 
adopted in a World Bank technical paper (Pannier 1996) 
stating that „the reform of the public enterprise sector is 
at the heart of structural transformation in TCs” and con­
sidering that „a number of enterprises are likely to remain 
in the public sector for an indefinite period awaiting pri­
vatization”. The same study covers various useful sug­
gestions (recipes?) for selecting agents to represent the 
State on corporate boards, for improving the management 
of SOEs (public enterprises), for selecting managers,
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evaluating their performance and providing them with 
accurate incentives (including management contracts 
between the government and private managers) and, even 
more basic, for running properly the board of directors in 
a public enterprise. The last point opens a research area 
which goes far beyond corporate governance and the 
principal-agent model.
Corporate governance and beyond: a new research 
focus on the tracks?
„When privatization’ became the word of the day in 
Eastern Europe, most policy makers and external 
observers made a number of rather simplistic assump­
tions which have since become increasingly hard to main­
tain”, and „assumptions underlying the initial approach 
became increasingly inadequate” (Frydman, Rapaczynski 
1994, p. 168-169). No doubt, this statement applies to the 
assumptions derived from the principal-agent model. 
Now, let us abandon this mainstream approach to corpo­
rate governance that had mushroomed in the first stage of 
privatization following up the influential articles by 
Jensen, Meckling (1976) and Fama, Jensen (1983) on 
principal-agent problems. We are not left without alterna­
tive or, better, complementary theoretical explanations of 
who makes decision in emerging corporations in TCs. 
First there is a theory of corporate control, that had pre­
vailed since the work by Berle, Means (1932) in a less- 
developed stage of market capitalism in the West and 
before the emergence of the agency costs analysis. 
Second, we can also dwell upon the more recent literature 
on coalitions within economic organizations.
Now the TCs are entering a second stage of the pri­
vatization process, giving up the focus on speed and 
quantity, and switching the emphasis on to the quality of 
corporate governance, the structure of corporate control 
and the legality, confidence, reputation and trust normal­
ly associated with private ownership in market 
economies. Such qualitative problems had been solved 
several decades ago in Western capitalism. The theory of 
corporate control and the first analyses of economic orga­
nizations are contemporary to the solutions brought to 
these qualitative problems a few decades ago. The corre­
sponding literature should recover some interest for TCs 
-  it is at least our assumption -  insofar as they had not yet 
achieved a fully-fledged capitalist corporate control and 
structure; thus, they are more facing the same corporate 
control shortcomings of an earlier stage of capitalist 
development than the characteristics of financial market
discipline imposed in last resort on corporate governance 
nowadays by the financial globalization in the West.
In some way, an attempt to initiate a new approach is 
present in the recent work by Earle and Estrin (1997). 
They argue that the peculiarities of ownership structures 
in Russia require a „reconsideration of conceptual 
approaches to the analysis of corporate ownership, con­
trol and behaviour”. Ownership structures are quite pecu­
liar in all other TCs, at least when compared to today‘s 
Western market economies. Maybe less peculiar if com­
pared to ownership structures of an earlier stage of capi­
talist development that prevailed some decades ago in the 
West. As it is emphasized in the Earle-Estrin research, 
what matters is not only the concentration of ownership, 
but also the idendity of owners. I fully agree. Let me go 
further and cross the Rubicon: who personally are the 
new owners and what are their number on seats on differ­
ent corporate boards, their behaviour of shameless 
tycoons, the shares they personally own, their alliances 
(or interest groups), their wealth, their legal or illegal 
manoeuvers, etc.? These also do matter. Part of such 
information can be submitted to a scientific treatment 
with economic analytical tools which were up to date in 
the West a few decades ago, in an earlier stage of devel­
opment. We only draw some guidelines of what could be 
done in coming researches.
Who owns whom ? The realm o f core shareholders, merg­
ers and takeover bids
The theory of corporate control originated by Berle and 
Means has developed either as a reaction against the idea 
of managerial enterprise (Marris 1964, Galbraith 1967) or 
as a consequence of empirical studies of corporate control 
(Burch 1972, Kotz 1978, Lamer 1966, Morin 1974, 
Paströ 1979). According to this literature, governance had 
not become utterly independent from ownership in cor­
porations operating in Western market economies, a fact 
that was exemplified by existing ,hard cores’ of monitor­
ing shareholders, cross shareholding among several cor­
porations and docked up’ companies; the latter are meant 
to be corporations whose capital is owned by their own 
affiliates in a significant (majority) proportion and which 
cannot consequently be taken over by raiders. Even 
before the theory of property rights and corporate gover­
nance, this literature distinguished insider (usually man­
agerial) control and outsider control by a hard core of 
strategic shareholders, family members of a former 
tycoon, banks, and institutional investors. The whole
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issue was not only depending on the concentration or dis­
persion of shareholding, but also based on distinguishing 
majority and minority control of shares (and the blocking 
percentage of shares). The basic hypothesis was that cor­
porate control structures are not static or fixed for ever, 
and that they are moving due to mergers, acquisitions, 
takeover bids (tenders) and, in the most sophisticated ver­
sions, to proxy fights for electing the firm's boards (for 
some more details, Andreff 1996b). Though moving, the 
financial capital structure is interlocking a number of 
industrial firms and banks, through cross shareholdings, 
into so-called financial industrial groups (FIGs) with a 
'parent company' (a bank or non financial firm) at its core. 
This is precisely a valuable analysis for TCs today.
After mass privatization, in Russian enterprises, var­
ious interest groups gathered around a new tycoon and/or 
a handful of managers, often with the cooperation of one 
bank, have started to collect privatization certificates or 
shares during the second stage of monetary privatization. 
The result is both an increased weight of outsiders in the 
new emerging FIGs (Andreff, Rady gin, Malginov 1996) 
and the coordination of (namely supply) strategies among 
the firms linked through cross shareholding to each 
group. In Russia, after some delay, the government has 
begun to sell its remaining shares in some most promi­
nent enterprises, including the ones that were held by 
commercial banks through the 'loans-for-shares' scheme 
in 1995. Tenders and auctions for these shares have 
become a battleground between rival FIGs with a move of 
the boundaries between their networks of cross owner­
ship. After 1995, acquisitions and takeovers had devel­
oped in Russia. Just to mention a few recent examples, 
Oneximbank took over Norilsk Nickel and Sviazinvest in 
buying shares through monetary privatization, Yukos and 
Sibneft merged into Yukos and, with the participation of 
foreign firms, ARCO acquired 10% of Loukoil's capital, 
BP took a 10% share in Sidanco, Elf-Aquitaine bought 
5% of Yuksi’s stock equity. We are now facing the need to 
study all the networks of these financial stakes linking 
firms and banks together in order to detect which interest 
group, possibly associating various outsiders or outsiders 
to insiders, controls a FIG, i.e. to know really who owns 
whom. With a FIG structure, two hypotheses of the theo­
ry of corporate governance are no longer relevant: on the 
one hand, the assumed relationship between profitability 
and the nature (insider/outsider) of corporate governance 
may well be disrupted in many cases, so that some con­
flicting results between the aforementioned empirical 
studies of sampled enterprises may turn us back to the
missing dimension of the interest groups involved; on the 
other hand, corporate governance is not stable and moves 
with mergers, takeovers, redistribution of shares and pos­
sible new alliances or coalitions between insiders and 
outsiders.
The interest groups backing the FIG structure are 
going beyond the theoretical cleavage between outsider 
and insider governance, so that it is no longer realistic to 
assume that outsiders (and which group among them?) 
must have, as residual claimants, the last say on firm’s 
boards. Do outsiders (or their representatives) benefit 
from majority proxy votes for the board of directors? 
Which outsiders’ group does obtain the majority? Is the 
controlling interest group maintained or not (namely after 
a proxy fight)? All questions that arise now in the new 
privatized corporations of the TCs, in particular for FIGs 
and for FDI that has proceeded through acquisitions of 
shares in local enterprises, a rather frequent operation 
(Meyer, Estrin 1997) in most of the TCs. A wide area of 
research will open as soon as enough information will be 
published on the precise distribution of the firm's stock 
equity between various (groups of) shareholders, because 
it will enable us to detect cross ownership, financial chain 
control among the firms of a FIG, etc., in using the 
methodologies used by Berle, Means, Lamer and others, 
or to put it otherwise, it will enable us to study the struc­
ture of the 'bank-based financial capitalism' (Mertlik 
1998).
Interlocking directorates
When one is to deal with economic situations that fall 
between market and hierarchy, namely the observed 
resilient networks of managers in many TCs or the new 
emerging FIGs, a glance at the literature on interlocking 
directorates (Bunting, Barbour 1971, Dooley 1969) is a 
must. The market relationships of the interlocked firms 
are not nullified, yet interlocks impose some hierarchy 
(Pennings 1980); both competition and control are 
implied in a cluster of interlocked firms. Multiple inter­
locks usually indicate a strong relationship between firms 
that can express a common interest group governing, con­
trolling or, at least, coordinating the strategies among the 
interlocked firms. The basic idea underlying interlocking 
directorates is that corporate control cannot be studied for 
a firm (a fortiori a FIG) in isolation, contrary to what is 
done in the standard corporate governance analysis. A 
well-established result of studies based on the statistical 
treatment with the graph theory of sampled board mem-
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bers, is that in Western market economies, interlocked 
firms are clustered together by 'linkers' or 'big linkers', i.e. 
often managers, sometimes owners, who simultaneously 
belong to the boards of two, three, four, etc., different 
firms and who increasingly link firms of different nation­
al origins; some banks are usually interlocked in each 
cluster (Fennema 1982, Koenig, Gogel 1981, Paströ 
1979).
Could we expect some interesting results from a sim­
ilar approach applied to firms in TCs? Let us consider 
first the TCs in which we can already observe the forma­
tion of FIGs, first of all in Russia and some NIS. It would 
be of strong interest to check whether the industrial firms 
and banks are connected in the FIGs through interlocking 
directorates -  my guess is that they actually are! The 
problem is that testing the existence of interlocking direc­
torates requires to have at our disposal information such 
as the one published (in the West) by Who's Who, 
Kompass, Moody's, Fortune Directories and so on. Such 
information is not yet fully available in the TCs, except 
some pieces of it in journals like Kommersant for 
instance. However, a first step towards this sort of study 
consists in examining in how many enterprise boards 
have a seat some business VIPs named Yevgeny Ananiev 
(MAPO-Bank), Boris Berezovski (LogoVaz), Mikhail 
Fridman (Sidanko), Vladimir Gusinski (Most-Bank), 
Mikhail Khodorovski (Yuksi), Igor Malachenko (NTV), 
Vladimir Potanin (Oneximbank), Alexander Smolenski 
(SBS-Agro), Rem Viakhirev (Gazprom), etc., in Russia. 
Detecting clusters of firms through interlocking direc­
torates might also be helpful in the case of recombinant 
property (Stark 1996a,b) mixing private and public inter­
ests in Hungary25 or in that of links and alliances 
between the directors of Czech enterprises (Me Dermott 
1990) which had been swallowed but not dissolved by the 
privatization process.
Another case in point is the exercise of residual State 
property rights in partially privatized enterprises, particu­
larly in the TCs where a same State representative can be 
appointed on the boards of more than one enterprise (up 
to four in some TCs). A first attempt at elaborating on this 
kind of analysis is already provided in a recent research 
on enterprise-State relations after mass privatization in 
Mongolia (J. Anderson et alii 1997). The authors present 
data on board membership in order to detect how many 
representatives do seat on the boards of privatized corpo­
rations, and conclude that the State is not a disinterested 
owner. Indeed, 63.7% of Mongolian enterprises have 
some State representation on one or both their boards
(board of representatives and auditing board) and even 
41.5% of enterprises with no State ownership have a gov­
ernment official on at least one of the boards. In view of 
reinforcing another conclusion of this research, namely 
that „the picture that emerges is of a cohesive public sec­
tor that has arisen after the privatization process” due to 
State representation on firms’ boards, a further research 
may be suggested: it should consist in checking whether 
we can find among State representatives some .linkers’ or 
,big linkers’ who interlink the boards of different firms 
together.
Coalitions, shareholders and stakeholders
The theory of economic organizations, at least a part of it, 
focuses on coalitions (Cyert, March 1963, Mintzberg 
1979, 1983). Among the participants in a firm, some sub­
sets or groups can coalesce around a mutual target of sat­
isfying results under the hypothesis of a bounded ratio­
nality of economic agents. At any moment, some coali­
tion dominates the enterprise but can be removed by 
another in the making. The ruling coalition should adopt 
a management providing the highest return on assets 
(Tirolé 1988) if we want a formally privatized firm to be 
transformed into a private firm maximizing its profit. But 
that is the type of coalition in power and contingencies of 
economic environment that determine, according to the 
theory of organizations, the kind of target which must 
reach a satisfying level in the firm: efficiency, survival, 
autonomy, growth, asset value or another one (Mintzberg 
1983). The emergence of a new dominating coalition 
within the enterprise can obviously change the prevailing 
target (Cornelii, Li 1994). Even though survival usually 
characterizes insider coalitions and profit making out­
sider coalitions, the real picture in a corporation is often 
more blurred. It is all the more so when managers are 
shareowners (and vice versa), when employees own 
shares, when there is discord within the management 
team or the corporate boards or (rather frequent) alliances 
between some managers and core shareholders. More 
subjective elements can play a role. According to 
Mintzberg, major factors of a coalition stability are orga­
nization (enterprise) ideology, resource slack, and the co­
ordinating role of the chief executive officer (company 
head director). Once all these factors are taken into 
account, the objective functions of insiders and outsiders 
might well overlap in many respects and in many firms. 
A deeper analysis of the ruling coalitions in various pri­
vatized firms would help to detect a revealed (probably
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multi-variable) objective function for each type of coali­
tions. Less simplistic than the distinction between the 
profit-seeking behaviour of residual claimants versus the 
rent-seeking and take home gains behaviour of managers 
and employees, this seemingly old-fashioned analysis is 
of peculiar interest in a nascent market capitalism, which 
is the case of the TCs today.
In an inner coalition of the firm can of course partic­
ipate shareholders as well as stakeholders; in fact the lat­
ter are also, to some extent, shareholders, if we consider 
that a firm needs both finance capital and human capital 
to function, and thus both are residual claimants, and 
must be 'rewarded' as such out of the firm's revenue. In a 
nutshell, this is the core argument of an attempt to renew 
the analysis of corporate governance (Blair 1995). As to 
Blair, most Western modern corporations do not fit the 
Easterbrook-Fischel model of corporate governance and 
the underlying analysis of the principal-agent, because in 
practice shareholders are rarely the only residual 
claimants. As some of the newest work in the economics 
of organizations is only beginning to recognize and deal 
with, any time there are parties other than shareholders 
who make investments specific to a given corporation, 
namely employees with specialized knowledge or skills. 
These 'firm specific investments' create several complex 
governance problems (in the West). If assets such as 
finance capital and human capital are dependent on each 
other, co-specialized, by definition neither has much 
value without the other. Neither as a more legitimate 
claim for residual revenue than the other. Then the main­
stream model falters.
The firm (i.e. capital shareholders) must share with 
employees some of the economic rents (or quasi rents) 
from 'their common' enterprise. But, for instance, if the 
employees helped pay the cost of their training (by 
accepting a lower wage during the training period) in 
exchange for a promise of higher wages later, the firm is 
then in a position to expropriate some of the rents 
promised to employees by threatening to close down the 
business unless workers agree to work at a wage that is 
lower than what they have been profnised, or to fire them. 
The promised higher payments to employees thus are 
viewed as a cost to the shareholders. Anyway, we can wit­
ness no (or very few) close downs or job cuts after each 
training session. This is due to the most compelling evi­
dence that firm-specific human capital is extremely 
important to the firm, and finally is worth being extra- 
paid, of course on the economic surplus generated by the 
firm. So that the emphasis of the mainstream model on
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the potential conflict between shareholders and managers 
is wrong. This is the stakeholder management nexus that 
is important, whoever the stakeholders (managers, 
employees, shareholders) are, and the modem corpora­
tions should be run in the interest of all the stakeholders, 
rather than just for the shareholders26. In the same vein, 
Nuti (1995) argues that in employee-owned privatized 
enterprises, each employee should own a share in the 
stock equity of the same value as his/her share in the total 
wage bill. If the wage is assumed to reward specific skills 
and training, then each employee will share in the resid­
ual revenue proportionally to his/her stake among all 
stakeholders.
A last problem is the legal or non legal behaviour of 
stakeholders and shareowners. We have already referred 
to embezzlements, pressures on small shareholders, law 
violations, exploitation of loopholes and so on, that part­
ly are a legacy of the informational cheeting inherited 
from the former system (Andreff 1996c). Such distortions 
call into question the legitimacy of ownership and of 
sharing the residual revenue with (or among) economic 
criminals. Beyond the moral concern, it is an issue of eco­
nomic efficiency just like it is with other illegal or cor­
rupted activities. Corruption is of course a kind of crimi­
nal behaviour which threatens the development of the 
market economy. In addition, organized crime, illegal 
transactions, protection rackets impose an economic cost 
on the TCs (the more eastwards, the higher cost) in the 
forms of distorted resource allocation, a heavy „private 
tax” burden27, limited competition and capital flight 
abroad. The average corruption score, obtained in the 
World Bank survey of 3,600 entrepreneurs in 69 coun­
tries, is higher for the TCs than in any other region in the 
world (EBRD 1997). In many TCs, in particular in NIS, 
it seems that after the collapse of the planned economy 
managers continue to develop networks of personal rela­
tionships with government officials and with other firms 
(Andreff 1996c, Rizopoulos 1997). Corruption is often 
the fuel for such networks. This obviously means that 
managers involved in corrupted networks either are not 
under the control of supposedly honest owners or are col­
luded with new shameless or somewhat criminal tycoons, 
namely in Russia and eastwards. Anyway, in all such 
cases, privatization is then turned into its contrary, busi­
ness corruption ,which was not the purpose of the priva­
tization process and might not be a foot ahead on the path 
to a true market economy. Such a deviation is the more 
dangerous one for the future of NIS and should not 
remain uncriticized and unrepressed; only a stronger
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Table 1
Index of GDP growth and the share of private sector 
in GDP of transition countries (1990,1995)
Countries Index o f GDP growth The share of private sector
in GDP (in %)
Ig 1990 Ig 1995 Sps 1990 Sps 1995
Albania * 86,9 113,4 5% 59%
Armenia * 91,8 105,2 12% 44%
Azerbaijan * 88,7 82 ,8 10% 25%
Belarus * 96,8 90 5% 12%
Bulgaria 90,9 102,5 9% 35%
Croatia ** 91,5 98 ,5 10% 47%
Czech Rep. 98,8 105,2 5% 69%
Estonia 91,9 102,5 10% 60%
Georgia * 95,7 102,4 26% 30%
Hungary 96,7 102 19% 60%
Kazakhstan * 99,1 91,1 7% 25%
Kirghizstan * 104,8 93 ,8 7% 40%
Latvia 9 73 98 ,4 10% 57%
Lithuania 93,1 102 11% 55%
Macedonia ** 89,8 97 14% 40%
Moldova * 98,5 97 10% 30%
Poland 88,4 107 27% 58%
Romania 91.8 106,9 17% 37%
Russia 96 96 6% 58%
Slovakia 97,5 107,4 6% 59%
Slovenia 95 3 104,8 11% 37%
Tadjikistan * 100,2 87 ,6 10% 15%
Turkmenistan* 101,8 92 ,5 10% 15%
Ukraine * 96,4 88 10% 36%
Uzbekistan * 1043 99 10% 30%
* Net material product in 1990; ** Gross material product in 1990. 
Sources : UNECE (1996) for growth indexes and World Bank (1996) 
for the share of private sector in GDP.
State could crack down on corruption with a chance of 
success (Andreff 1995b). After the first stage of transi­
tion, when prominent neo-liberal assertions associated 
State minimalism with market efficiency, a closer analy­
sis is now re-evaluating the role of the State in the market 
economy, and influential economists like N. Stern, J. 
Stiglitz, or E. Malinvaud (1997) emphasize the impor­
tance of cooperation and partnership between public and 
private activities. This does not mean increasing the gov­
ernment interference in privatized enterprises which still 
remain pervasive in many TCs, in particular in NIS. State 
regulation is required to control again monopoly power in 
privatized utilities and sectors where private stakes have 
won privileged position, often from the government and 
sometimes through illicit or corrupted means.
Conclusion: Where has all 
the privatization gone?
„Rather than an unquestionned boon, privatization thus 
becomes an ambiguous, open-ended process that might 
lead to bad as well as good consequences” (Frydman,
Rapaczynski 1994). Let us conclude first with the good 
news. Small privatization is a big success. Privatization, 
as a general drive of the whole economy, has improved 
macroeconomic performance as well as microeconomic 
performance for a subset of large and medium-sized 
firms. The privatization process has been able to attract 
significant FDI and some domestic strategic investors. 
But if we stopped the listing here, it could only be for the 
sake of providing a rosy picture. The overall picture of 
privatization also encompasses a lot of deviations from 
the initial objectives of the privatization drive, the short­
list of which is: ineffective corporate governance, corrup­
tion, ,socialization’ and municipalization of assets, a vari­
ety of ownership types (and not only a fully-fledged pri­
vate ownership) including a 'sticky' residual State owner­
ship. Many of these distortions reflect some kind of path- 
dependence in the privatization process.
Some readers will regard my second concluding 
remark as a piece of economic semantics. Well, the result 
of a process transfering assets out of the central State 
hands is defined as privatization. What about this label 
when ownership falls into the hands of employees? Why 
not call it employee-owned privatization? If so, not long 
ago employee-ownership was associated with socializa­
tion’ of ownership, profit sharing and self-management. 
Should we also speak of privatization when assets are 
transferred to municipalities? Why not 'municipalization' 
of ownership? In old times -  maybe not so old -  a man­
ager-controlled enterprise simply was denominated a 
managerial firm (remember Burnham, Galbraith, Marris), 
and a „mixed” enterprise was the label for both a private 
firm with residual State ownership after privatization and 
a public enterprise with residual private ownership after 
nationalization. Thus the privatization process resulted in 
... some privatization as well as some socialization, 
municipalization, mixed ownership and 'managerialism'. 
In the first years of transition, in many circles, it was 
probably taboo to put it this way. But all these forms of 
ownership have existed, to some extent, in Western 
economies in the past, and some have not yet completely 
disappeared. Probably was it dreamed that the TCs could 
jump over this earlier stage of capitalist development 
directly to the ,realm’ of international finance markets 
and economic globalization, starting the whole story by 
its very end. The economic reality is that the TCs have got 
through the privatization process a ,motley crew’ of own­
ership structures for a while.
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T ab le  2
Big privatization by mid -  1995 (number of entreprises)
















Belarus 3000 25 125 150 5%
Bulgaria 3500 286 109 395 11%
Czech Rep. 4319 3898 1622 n.d. n.d. 5310(7) 260 3505 81%
Estonia 500 357 120(6) 357 71%
Georgia 1100 6 19 25 2%
Hungary 1848 866 2 2787(6) 662 536 1400 76%
Kazakhstan n.d. 4 532 536 n.d.
Latvia 650 45 200 55 n.d. 301 46%
Lithuania 4800 62 2920 n.d. 2982 62%
Moldova 3000 800 800 27%
Mongolia 1406 41 430 98 650 46%
Poland 8200 142 806 22 165 1400 2535 31%
Romania 7100 10 981 9 1000 14%
Russia 31000 40 4400 11520 1000 17000 55%
Slovakia 1265 361 392 n.d. 135(8) n.d. 556 44%
Slovenia (9) 1280 60 n.d. 25 20 113 9%
Ukraine 3500 1 49 3500 3550 n.d.
(1) The only medium and big sized enterprises taken into account are those with 50% or more State-owned stock equity.
(2) OECD estimate of the number of medium and big sized enterprises at the starting point of privatization.
(3) Direct sales to private buyers, auction sales and tenders of State assets and enterprises.
(4) This number can be different from the sum of figures given in all the left-hand rows, due to break-ups, liquidations, 
mergers, etc., going alongside with privatization.
(5) Estimated percentage which is only indicative insofar as it is biased by what is staled in (4).
(6) Buy-outs for compensation vouchers.
(7) Of which 4380 are given away for free to municipalities and 930 are subject to restitution.
(8) Free transfers to municipalities.
(9) Data by mid-1994.
Source: Adaptalcd from OECD (1995).
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T a b le  3
Foreign direct investment and privatization in transition countries (1995)
Countries FDI stock per 
capita (1)
Share o f private 
sector in GDP(%)
Countries FDI stock pier 
capita (1)
Share of private 
sector in GDP(%)
Armenia 44% 5.56 Lithuania 55% 38.92
Azerbaijan 25% 39.08 Moldova 30% 24.32
Belarus 12% 3.86 Poland 58% 222.08
Bulgaria 35% 40.00 Romania 37% 42.59
Czech Republic 69% 398.06 Russia 58% 27.58
Estonia 60% 424.67 Slovakia 59% 108.33
Georgia 30% 2.55 Slovenia 37% 278.42
Hungary 60% 1289.90 Tajikistan 15% 3.77
Kazakhstan 25% 41.81 T urkmenistan 15% 48.78
Kyrgyzstan 40% 8.51 Ukraine 36% 16.07
Latvia 57% ■ 180.00 Uzbekistan 30% 11.18
(1) Stock o f foreign direct investment in dollars divided by population (M. & W. Andreff 1998). 
Sources : UNCTAD (1997) for FDI, World Bank (1996) for the share o f private sector.
T ab le  4
Foreign share of privatisation and methods of privatization







Bulgaria 24% Primary Secondary
Czech Republic 5% Secondary Primary Tertiary
Estoma 14% Primary Secondary
Hungary 58% Primary Secondary
Latvia 8% Secondary Primary
Lithuania 2% Primary Secondary
Poland 22% Tertiary Secondary Primary
Slovakia 13% Secondary Primary
(1) Percentage of foreign capital in the total transaction value up to January 1996 (OECD). 
Source: EBRD (1997) for the ranking of privatization methods.
Share of the unofficial economy in GDP, 1989-1995, 
selected transition economies (in %)
T a b le  5
Countries 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Variation
*
Azerbaijan 12.0 21.9 22.7 r  39.2 5J.2 58.0 60.6 (+48.6)
Belarus 12 0 15.4 16.6 13.2 11.0 18.9 19.3 (+7.3)
Bulgaria 22.8 25.1 23.9 25.0 29.9 29.1 36.2 (+13.4)
Czech
Republic
6.0 6.7 12.9 16.9 16.9 17.6 11.3 (+5.3)
Estonia 12.0 19.9 26.2 25.4 24.1 25.1 11.8 (-0.2)
Georgia 12.0 24.9 36.0 52.3 61.0 63.5 62.6 (+50.6)
Hungary 27.0 28.0 32.9 30.6 28.5 27.7 29.0 (+2.0)
Kazakhstan 12 0 17.0 19.7 24.9 27.2 34.1 34.3 (+22.3)
Latvia 12.0 12.8 19.0 34.3 31 0 34.2 35.3 (+23.3)
Lithuania 12.0 11.3 218 39.2 31.7 28.7 21.6 (+9.6)
Moldova 12.0 18 1 27.1 37.3 34.0 39.7 35.7 (+23.7)
Poland 15.7 19 6 23.5 19.7 18.5 15.2 12.6 (-3.1)
Romania 22.3 13.7 15.7 18.0 16.4 17.4 19.1 (-3.2)
Russia 12.0 14.7 23.5 32.8 36.7 40.3 41.6 (+29.6)
Slovakia 6.0 7.7 15.1 17.6 16.2 14.6 5.8 (-0.2)
Ukraine 12.0 16.3 25.6 33.6 38.0 45.7 48.9 (+36.9)
Uzbekistan 12.0 11.4 7.8 11.7 10.1 9.5 6.5 (-5.5)
Mean 13.6 16.7 21.8 27.7 28.4 30.5 29.0 (+15.4)
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Footnotes
1 This paper was read at the Conference on Privatization, Corporate 
Governance and the Emergence of Markets in Central-Eastern Europe, 
Berlin, May 22-23, 1998
2 In this paper, TCs are meant to be all the former CMEA and for­
mer Yugoslavia countries, even though we will only focus on some 
most meaningful experiences with privatization.
3 A more comprehensive coverage and personal analysis of privati­
zation objectives can be found in Andreff (1993a, 1993b, 1994a,b).
4 For a personal comparative evaluation of the efficiency of all the 
existing -  standard and non-standard methods (techniques) of privati­
zation -, see Andreff (1992, 1993a,c, 1994a,b,c).
5 Path-dependency is the core anaytical framework of some non­
standard theoretical approaches to economic transformation in TCs, 
namely: Chavance-Magnin (1995), Me Dermott (1994), Rizopoulos 
(1997), Stark (1992, 1996a, 1996b), Van Zon (1995). We have assessed 
elsewhere how much it is valuable for increasing our analytical under­
standing of the post-Socialist 'systemic change' but also which are the 
methodological hindrances to its successful empirical test in Andreff 
(1996c).
6 For large-scale privatization, 1 means little private ownership, 2 
comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation, 4 more than 
50% of former State-owned enterprises in private ownership and signif­
icant progress in their corporate governance. For small-scale privatiza­
tion, 2 means substantial share privatized, 4 complete privatization of 
small companies with tradable ownership rights.
7 According to estimates quoted in EBRD (1997), on average in 
1995, the ab initio private sector accounted for 42% of GDP in the 
CEECs (including the Baltic states) against only 23% in the NIS.
8 For instance, between 1992 and 1995, industrial output in Poland 
increased by 34%, and the new private sector accounted for approxi­
mately two-thirds of this increase (Gomulka 1997)
9 In 1997, according to EBRD (1997), the private sector share had 
reached or exceeded 50% of GDP in 19 of the EBRD's 26 countries of 
operation, while economic recovery was on the tracks in 18 of them.
10 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia. 3*5
11 The results of several studies or inquiries and with various enter­
prise samples converge towards such a conclusion, namely Pinto, van 
Wijnbergen (1995), Andreff (1995), Mickiewicz (1996), Nivet (1997), 
Grosfeld, Ni vet (1997).
12 The alternative „long way” to privatization advocated, on various 
grounds, by Janos Komái, Peter Murrell, Wlodzimierz Brus, David 
Stark, Kazimierz Laski, Lubomir Mlcoch, Lubomir Rychetnik, myself 
and (a few) others, actually has not so far been adopted in most TCs, 
partly due to political and ideological reasons (according to Mlcoch 
1997), and not after a comparative.assessment of how much efficient are 
all the different methods of privatization, namely in terms of corporate 
governance, as suggested in (Andreff 1991a,b, 1992, 1993a).
13 Namely R. Anderson et alii (1997), Barberis et alii (1996), R. 
Frydman et alii (1997).
14 Namely Lastovicka et alii (1995), Capek, Mertlik (1996), Coffee 
(1996).
15 See R. Anderson et alii (1997), Carlin et alii (1995), Carlin, 
Aghion (1996), Frydman et alii (1997), Grosfeld, Roland (1995)
16 This findings is less mainstream than expected and is interpreted 
by the authors as follows: 'domestic non-financial companies' may be a 
label that sometimes hides more complex insider holdings resulting 
from cross ownership (a nice introduction to the third part of this paper).
17 Not much mainstream either.
18 Within the tight model of principal-agent realtionships.
19 The swiftly growing literature on residual State property primari­
ly focuses on partly privatized enterprises: Bim (1996), Brom (1996), 
Mihály (1996b), Pistor, Turkewitz (1996), Radygin (1996), Schwartz
(1996) , Thieme (1996).
20 Sometimes, the residual State property is only refered to as 
„shares that are still kept on the State's books, as a consequence of a par­
tial privatization of formerly wholly-owned State assets” (Thieme 
1996).
21 Especially in countries where a same State representative can seat 
on the boards of more than one enterprise.
22 Mihály (1996b) reports that desk officers are strongly motivated 
and well-paid, thus they tend to use the economic and managerial power 
they possess.
23 Here we also could mention the experience and failure of the 
Algerian holdings (Fonds de participation) launched, as a pre-privatiza­
tion device, in 1988 and finally abandoned in 1996 (following the 
experts report to the Minister of Restructuring and Participation of 
Algeria in 1994 the writing of which we have participated to). See also 
Andreff (1995a).
24 Or, more often, distorsions introduced by a sort of non legal or 
criminal privatization of management with the help of former (or new) 
informal networks connecting managers to the irregular economy and, 
to some extent, to the mafia (especially in NIS). Contrarily to Pejovich
(1997) , we consider that there cannot be any „case for the Mafia” in a 
successful process of privatization (and transition).
25 By the way, ownership links between banks and SOEs were cut 
drastically in Hungary, and by 1996 cross ownership has become rare 
exception (Mihály 1997b). It would be interesting and significant to 
investigate whether interlocking directorates have been maintained 
between these entities.
26 For a more comprehensive, detailed and convincing demonstra­
tion, see Blair (1995).
27 One can find in Raiser (1997), the rates of „unofficial fees” (in 
dollars) that were to be paid in Russia and Ukraine, in 1994 and 1996, 
for „favours” such as enterprise registration, each visit by fire, health or 
tax inspector, each phone line installation, a lease in State space, an 
export or import licence, a border crossing, and a hard currency loan. Of 
course, the most criminal private taxation escape to the scope of (safe) 
inquiries.
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